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THE EMERGING LAW OF  
PORTABLE RETIREMENT BENEFITS 
PAUL M. SECUNDA*
INTRODUCTION
Alt-labor1 and the sharing economy2 have recently come to dominate 
the writings of labor and employment law scholars.3 Misclassification,4
union organizing,5 and wage and hour issues,6 have all been scrutinized as 
* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. Georgetown University Law Center, J.D.; 
Harvard College, A.B. This paper was presented as part of the Chicago-Kent Law Review Symposium 
on Alt-Labor Law: The State of the New Labor Movement on November 14, 2019. Thanks to Professors 
Cesar Rosado and Michael Oswalt for soliciting this contribution to the Symposium. 
 1.  According to Professor Oswalt: 
The term alt-labor tends to refer to organizing efforts aimed at improving working conditions primarily 
through avenues other than collective bargaining. Because unions support and even fund many alt-
groups and alt-campaigns, marking where “traditional” labor ends and alt-labor begins can be debata-
ble. Michael M. Oswalt, Alt-Bargaining, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 96 (2019); see also Josh 
Eidelson, Alt-Labor, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 29, 2013), http://prospect.org/article/alt-
labor [https://perma.cc/TXX5-W4SR] (coining the term “alt-labor”). 
 2.  The sharing economy refers to “the most prominent example of a new model of production 
and consumption of goods and services often referred to as ‘sharing,’ ‘collaborative consumption,’ or 
‘peer-to-peer consumption.’” See Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, The Tax Lives of Uber Drivers: 
Evidence from Internet Discussion Forums, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. 57, 58 (2017). Other terms for “sharing 
economy” include “‘the disaggregated economy,’ ‘the peer-to-peer economy’ (P-2-P), ‘the human-to-
human economy’ (H-2-H), ‘the community marketplace,’ ‘the on-demand economy,’ ‘the App econo-
my,’ ‘the access economy,’ ‘the mesh economy,’ ‘the gig economy,’ and also, ‘the Uberization of 
everything.’” See Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 89 (2016). 
 3.  See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 2; Oswalt, supra note 1; Heather M. Whitney, Rethinking the Ban 
on Employer-Labor Organization Cooperation, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1455, 1480-94 (2016); Dayne 
Lee, Bundling “Alt-Labor”: How Policy Reform Can Facilitate Political Organization in Emerging 
Worker Movements, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 509, 529-35 (2016). 
 4.  See, e.g., Veena Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal 
Worker Identities, 105 CAL. L. REV. 65, 67 (2017); Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating 
the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1511, 1513-14 (2016); Brishen Rogers, Redefining Em-
ployment for the Modern Economy, AMER. CONST. SOC’Y (Oct. 2016), 
https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Redefining_Employment_for_the_Modern_Economy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HKS5-ZHY8] (observing that misclassification, subcontracting and franchising all 
“tend to deprive workers of their rights under employment laws, which generally do not protect inde-
pendent contractors and do not effectively protect many subcontracted workers or workers for fran-
chisees”). 
 5.  See, e.g., Oswalt, supra note 1; Hiba Hafiz, Picketing in the New Economy, 39 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1845 (2018); Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Joseph A. Seiner, A Modern Union for the Modern Economy,
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1727 (2018); Michael C. Duff, Alt-Labor, Secondary Boycotts, and Toward a 
Labor Organization Bargain, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 837, 843-49 (2014); Michael M. Os-
walt, Improvisational Unionism, 104 CAL. L. REV. 597, 609-10 (2016); Brishen Rogers, Libertarian 





      06/12/2020   13:18:38
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 113 Side B      06/12/2020   13:18:38
9 SECUNDA MACRO 1 EIC 5.4 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2020 10:53 PM 
218 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 95:1 
emerging issues for those who engage in alt-labor activities. In all this 
scholarship, the authors have mostly concerned themselves with workers 
who have precarious, less-than-full-time jobs in the new global economy of 
the early 21st century, and all of whom are seeking ways to improve their 
work conditions through organizing and other collective action outside the 
formalized collective bargaining process.7
One of the less discussed, but equally important, alt-labor topics con-
cerns the provision of retirement work benefits for the self-employed, 
workers at small businesses, as well as those in the precarious8 and gig-
oriented American workforce.9 Indeed, an increasing number of these 
workers will lack adequate retirement savings in the decades to come. This 
state of affairs exists in part because being labeled “independent contrac-
tors” or some other form of non-employee status is of utmost importance in 
the American workplace. Such classifications largely determine whether 
workers are covered by U.S. employment laws, as such laws center on the 
 6.  See, e.g., Jennifer J. Lee & Annie Smith, Regulating Wage Theft, 94 WASH. L. REV. 579 
(2019); Nicole Hallett, The Problem of Wage Theft, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 118-19 (2018); 
Daniel J. Galvin, Deterring Wage Theft: Alt-Labor, State Politics, and the Policy Determinants of 
Minimum Wage Compliance, 14 PERSP. ON POL. 324, 339-42 (2016). 
 7.  Members of the so-called “contingent” workforce or “precariat” (part-time, leased, temporary, 
and per diem workers) do not normally receive retirement benefits as part of their employment, in the 
same manner as core full-time workers. See Dubal, supra note 4, at 3. See also Hafiz, supra note 5, at 
1851 (“The increasing fragmentation of work arrangements—replacing vertically integrated firms with 
the transactional economies of subcontracting, outsourcing, franchising, and supply chain disintegra-
tion—accompanied by the rise of contingent work and growing evidence of employer purchasing 
power, has fundamentally decentralized employment.”). 
 8.  In the United States, as of March 2019, “retirement benefits were available to 31 percent of 
workers in the lowest 10th percent wage category.” See Employee Benefits in the United States – March 
2019, U.S. DEP’T LAB. (Sept. 19, 2019), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ebs2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WE3G-R92M]. Consequently, come old age, they are left to depend on mostly inade-
quate Social Security payments (averaging 45% income replacement) and little or non-existent personal 
savings. See Mark Miller, How to Improve Your Retirement Income if You Haven’t Saved, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/your-money/retirement-savings-income-social-
security.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/S8VN-
EQMY] (discussing Social Security income replacement rate); Matthew Frankel, Here’s the Average 
American’s Savings Rate, MOTLEY FOOL (Oct. 3, 2016), 
http://www.fool.com/investing/2016/10/03/heres-the-average-americans-savings-rate.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/2WLB-A5NZ] (“According to the latest data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, the personal saving rate in the United States is 5.7% . . . . This is far too low to adequately 
prepare most people for retirement and unexpected expenses. . . . Most experts recommend saving at 
least 10% to 15% of your income.”). One last point: not all whom lack access to retirement benefits are 
precarious workers. For example, the difference in compensation between free-lance writers and day-
laborers is huge, but both tend to lack occupational retirement benefits. I would like to thank Professor 
Catherine Fisk for bringing this important observation to my attention.  
 9.  Yet independent contractors, which are how many alt-labor companies classify their workers, 
are approximately two-thirds less likely than standard employees to have access to an employer-
provided retirement plan. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CONTINGENT WORKFORCE: SIZE,
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existence of an employer-employment relationship.10 Because American 
employers are increasingly seeking to define many workers as “independ-
ent contractors” or non-employees, these workers have little to no access to 
retirement plans.11 In turn, this is critical because, according to AARP, 
Americans workers are fifteen times more likely to save for retirement 
when they are covered by a workplace retirement plan.12
A number of proposals have emerged in recent years to provide these 
uncovered employees with portable occupational retirement benefits.13 Yet, 
so far, these proposals have not adequately come to grips with the problem 
of trying to provide self-employed, small business workers, or precarious 
workers with portable retirement security.14
Consequently, as I have argued previously,15 and continue to maintain 
in this article, it is essential that most of these workers be considered com-
mon law “employees” under the applicable Darden test for purposes of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).16 Perhaps 
even more importantly for the emerging law of portable retirement benefits, 
the statutory structure of ERISA is crucial because it provides for the mul-
tiple employer pension (MEP), a well-suited benefit plan arrangement that 
 10.  See Means & Seiner, supra note 4, at 1513-14 (“Employees cost more than independent 
contractors because businesses are responsible for . . . payroll taxes, workers’ compensation insurance, 
health care, minimum wage, overtime, and the reimbursement of business-related expenses.”).
 11.  Also, because they do not have discretionary income, these workers are not known to save for 
retirement on their own. See WILLIAM G. GALE, SARAH E. HOLMES & DAVID C. JOHN, BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION, RETIREMENT PLANS FOR CONTINGENT WORKERS: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 7-8 (Sept. 23, 
2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/rsp923paper1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W374-VSED] (“[R]ecent survey indicated that 31 percent of the users of a specific 
software product said that their main concern as an independent worker was a lack of employer-
sponsored benefits.”); id. at 7 (“Based on the limited data available, it appears that contingent workers 
are generally unprepared for retirement.”). 
 12.  See Catherine Harvey, Access to Workplace Retirement Plans By Race and Ethnicity, AARP
FACT SHEET (Feb. 2017), https://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/ppi/2017-
01/Retirement%20Access%20Race%20Ethnicity.pdf [https://perma.cc/VA5D-93ZL]. 
 13.  See, e.g., Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for 




 14.  See Natalie Foster, Greg Nelson & Libby Reder, Portable Benefits Resource Guide 7, THE 
ASPEN INST.: FUTURE OF WORK INITIATIVE (2016). 
 15.  See Paul M. Secunda, Uber Retirement, 2017 UNIV. CHI. LEG. F. 435, 439 (2018) [hereinafter 
Secunda, Uber Retirement]. 
 16.  Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2018); see
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (common law “control test” applies to 
ERISA employee definition); Rogers, supra note 4, at 1 (listing advantages of being considered com-
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matches the peripatetic, irregular, and non-exclusive nature of the work of 
many of these workers.17
A MEP is a single employer retirement benefit plan, not under a col-
lective bargaining agreement, that covers employees of more than 
one unrelated company.18 More specifically, one variety of these plans, 
open multiple employee pensions (“Open MEPs”), allow unaffiliated em-
ployers to pool their resources and offer retirement plans to their employees 
under the statutory protections of ERISA.19 Industries and companies, 
country-wide, that employ alt-labor workers potentially could constitute 
unaffiliated employers for MEP purposes under the right circumstances as 
will be discussed in more detail below and thus, this type of retirement plan 
could provide meaningful access to occupational retirement benefits to the 
group of workers who currently lack access to such benefits. 
Moreover, by designating a professional service organization (PEO) to 
administer an Open MEP, companies can largely limit their fiduciary liabil-
ity, as their only fiduciary action would be the selection and subsequent 
monitoring of the Open MEP plan sponsor.20 Making Open MEPS an alter-
native for securing retirement benefits for alt-labor workers is now a realis-
tic possibility. Already as recently as July 2019, the U.S. Department of 
Labor had outlined a number of new types of MEPs, including Association 
MEPs, PEO MEPs, and corporate MEPs, to attempt to fill the void in this 
part of the retirement plan marketplace.21 Unfortunately, these current vari-
eties fall short in meeting the promise of a truly Open MEP.22 Given that 
currently very few self-employed, small business, and precarious workers 
have access to such workplace retirement plans,23 and not all who do have 
 17.  See Secunda, Uber Retirement, supra note 15, at 437 n.19. 
 18.  See DWC, Meet the MEPs: Corporate MEPs, DWC THE 401(K) EXPERTS (Aug. 28, 2019), 
https://www.dwc401k.com/blog/meet-the-meps-corporate-meps [https://perma.cc/LW97-X7VC]. 
 19.  See generally ERISA Advisory Council, Outsourcing Employee Benefit Plan Services, U.S.
DEP’T LAB. 18-22 (2014), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/about-ebsa/about-us/erisa-
advisory-council/2014-outsourcing-employee-benefit-plan-services.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5JQ-
SAW4]. 
 20.  Id. at 19 (“Effectively, the participating employer has outsourced the provision of retirement 
benefits.”).  
 21.  See Definition of “Employer” Under Section 3(5) of ERISA-Association Retirement Plans 
and Other Multiple-Employer Plans, 84 Fed. Reg. 37508, 37508 (July 31, 2019) (to be codified at 29 
C.F.R. § 2510), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/07/31/2019-16074/definition-of-
employer-under-section-35-of-erisa-association-retirement-plans-and-other [https://perma.cc/DP5Z-
HSS5] [hereinafter DOL MEP Regulations]. 
 22.  Accord RIN 1210-AB92 “Open MEPs” and Other Issues Under Section 3(5) of ERISA, AM.
BENEFITS COUNCIL (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/pub/?ID=2CE1E192-
1866-DAAC-99FB-AD309F9D252E [https://perma.cc/959Z-7S8B]. 
 23.  Depending on whether alt-labor workers are considered independent contractors, the approx-
imately 38 million, or 23% of, private-sector employees in the United States that do not have access to a 
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access participate in them in any event, it is imperative to promulgate a 
legal framework that is simultaneously inexpensive to set up for employers, 
and that provides these workers the wherewithal to easily participate in 
plans in an affordable, easy-to-understand manner.24
The thesis of this article is two-fold. First, self-employed, small busi-
ness, and precarious workers must be considered common law employees 
under employee benefits law so that they can receive the consumer protec-
tions and the appropriate template of an approved retirement plan structure 
provided by ERISA. Second, under ERISA, these workers will most-likely 
receive meaningful access to retirement plans through the use of Open 
MEPs operated by PEOs. As this paper goes to press, Open MEPs run by 
PEOs have become a reality with the passage of the Setting Every Com-
munity up for Retirement Enhancement Act of 2019 (SECURE Act of 
2019).25 It will be important to educate, and give incentive to, employers 
who currently do not provide employment-based retirement benefits to 
consider joining one of these new employee benefit plan structures. 
This article sets out the Open MEP model for providing retirement 
benefits to workers without access currently to retirement benefits in four 
parts. Part II provides a brief overview of ERISA and the protections and 
structure it provides for workers looking to find their way to retirement 
security. Part III discusses recent MEP regulations issued by the Depart-
ment of Labor and the recent passage of the Secure Act of 2019. Part IV 
concludes by suggesting that this new Open MEP legislation could act as 
an eventual pathway to portable retirement benefits being unmoored from 
traditional conceptions of employment, so that terms like “independent 
contractor” and “employee” cease to have the definitive weight they now 
carry. In this manner, all workers would have access to, and then be able to 
meaningfully participate in, employer-provided tax-deferred retirement 
planning. 
Stats., Nat’l Compensation Survey: Emp. Benefits in the U.S., U.S. DEP’T LAB. (MARCH 2018), 
https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2018/employee-benefits-in-the-united-states-march-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GH7X-5M39]. According to the final DOL MEP regulations in the Federal Register: 
“The percentage of private-sector workers without access to a workplace retirement plan increases to 32 
percent when part-time workers are included.”  
 24.  See Eric Drobylen, How MEPs Signal a Broken 401(k) Industry, EMP. FIDUCIARY (Oct. 30, 
2019), https://www.employeefiduciary.com/blog/how-meps-signal-a-broken-401k-industry 
[https://perma.cc/H4PW-3RSQ] (“A straightforward and transparent 401(k) plan has three features - flat 
administration fees, passively-managed index funds, and basic administrative tasks for the employer to 
complete. Such plans offer diversified and cost-efficient market returns for participants and low liability 
and time commitment for business owners.”). 
 25. Setting Every Community Up for Retirement Enhancement Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-94, 
133 Stat. 2534 (2019). The Secure Act was passed as part of the Further Consolidated Appropriations 





      06/12/2020   13:18:38
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 115 Side B      06/12/2020   13:18:38
9 SECUNDA MACRO 1 EIC 5.4 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2020 10:53 PM 
222 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 95:1 
I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ERISA DEFINITIONS,
PROTECTIONS & PLAN STRUCTURES
ERISA is a comprehensive federal law that regulates the provision of 
employer-provided pension and welfare benefit plans.26 Although provision 
of employee benefits by employers is voluntary, once such plans are adopt-
ed, ERISA provides the applicable legal framework.27
ERISA is divided into four Titles, with Title I containing the lion’s 
share of applicable employee benefit provisions.28 Importantly, Title I, 
Subtitle A concerns general provisions regarding coverage and exemptions 
from coverage (Section 1003) and this limits DOL’s authority over em-
ployee benefit plans more generally. ERISA applies only to an “employee 
benefit plan” sponsored “by any employer.”29
Section 1003(a)(1) more specifically provides, in pertinent part, that 
ERISA “shall apply to any employee benefit plan if it is established or 
maintained by any employer engaged in commerce or in any industry or 
activity affecting commerce . . . .”30 In turn, ERISA defines “employee 
pension benefit plan” to include “any plan, fund, or program . . . estab-
lished or maintained by an employer . . . to the extent that by its express 
terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances,” it provides retirement 
income to employees or the deferral of income at the termination of em-
ployment or beyond.31 As the DOL recently stated in its final MEP regula-
tions, “the term ‘employer’ is essential to a benefit arrangement’s status as 
an ‘employee pension benefit plan’ within the meaning of ERISA. “A pre-
requisite for ERISA coverage is that the retirement plan must be estab-
lished or maintained by an ‘employer.’”32
ERISA defines an “employer” under Section 1002(5) as “any person 
acting directly as an employer, or indirectly in the interest of an employer, 
 26.  See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (“ERISA’s ‘comprehensive legis-
lative scheme’ includes ‘an integrated system of procedures for enforcement.’”).  
 27.  See Paul M. Secunda & Brendan S. Maher, Pension De-Risking, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 733, 
754 (2016) (“ERISA does not require that employers offer retirement benefits; it merely regulates 
retirement benefit promises that are made.”).  
 28.  Title II of ERISA amended the IRC to make it consistent with the new ERISA provisions, and 
Title III establishes the authority of the Departments of Labor and Treasury to enforce various provi-
sions of Title I and Title II. Title IV provides provisions for a federal insurer, the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), of one type of retirement plan, the defined benefit plan. See PAUL M.
SECUNDA ET AL., UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT LAW 184 (2019). None of these Titles are relevant 
for purposes of this article. 
 29.  Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 4(a)(1), 88 Stat. 
829, 839 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)(1) (2018)). 
 30.  Id.
 31.  29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A). 





      06/12/2020   13:18:38
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 116 Side A      06/12/2020   13:18:38
9 SECUNDA MACRO 1 EIC 5.4 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2020 10:53 PM 
2020] EMERGING LAW OF PORTABLE RETIREMENT BENEFITS 223 
in relation to an employee benefit plan; and includes a group or association 
of employers acting for an employer in such capacity.”33 ERISA is silent on 
what it means to act “directly as an employer” or “indirectly in the interest 
of an employer, in relation to an employee benefit plan” or what is meant 
by a “group or association of employers.”34 Because of this ambiguity, and 
as discussed in more detail below in Part II.A, the DOL took the opportuni-
ty to further define the meaning of the word “employer” in its final MEP 
regulations in 2019, and more specifically defined the meaning of both (i) a 
“bona fide” employer group or association and (ii) a “bona fide” profes-
sional employer organization (PEO).35
But that is not the end of the statutory puzzle. ERISA applies only to 
covered employee benefit “plans.”36 Courts apply the Dillingham factors 
and the Fort Halifax test to determine whether a “plan, fund, or program” is 
“established or maintained” by an employer and thus, qualifies for cover-
age under ERISA. Under Donovan v. Dillingham,37 there are four elements 
that must be present for a “plan” to exist under ERISA: (1) intended bene-
fits; (2) intended beneficiaries; (3) a source of financing; and (4) a proce-
dure to apply for and collect benefits.38 In Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. 
Coyne,39 the Supreme Court supplied a fifth factor when it required that 
there also be “ongoing plan administration.”40
Once it is turned you have an “employer” sponsoring a “benefit plan,” 
ERISA divides the universe of covered employee benefit plans into em-
ployee pension benefit plans and employee welfare benefit plans. Employ-
ee pension benefit plans are established and maintained by employers for 
the purpose of providing retirement income to employees through deferral 
of employee income until at least termination of employment.41 Employee 
welfare benefit plans, on the other hand, are established and maintained by 
employers to provide benefit programs that include health, disability, and 
life insurance; training programs; reimbursement for day-care centers; 
scholarship funds; and prepaid legal services.42
 33.  29 U.S.C. § 1002(5). 
 34.  See Meredith v. Time Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 352, 356 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[P]roblem lies, obviously 
enough, in determining what is meant by these oblique definitions of employer.”). 
 35.  See DOL MEP Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. at 37,511. 
 36.  29 U.S.C. § 1002(3). 
 37.  688 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 38.  Id. at 1372. 
 39.  482 U.S. 1 (1987). 
 40.  Id. at 18. 
 41.  29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A). 
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Although ERISA plans can also be categorized by the type and num-
ber of employers providing covered benefits, this article focuses solely on 
multiple employer plans (MEPs) run by unrelated employers outside of a 
collective bargaining agreement.43 Different provisions apply to different 
benefit plan arrangements under ERISA, but only the MEP regulation, 
which is the focus of this article, will be discussed in detail in the next 
Part.44
ERISA specifically prescribes how employee benefit plans must be es-
tablished and what basic provisions they must contain. For instance, an 
ERISA plan must be contained in a written instrument that provides for one 
or more named plan fiduciaries who are responsible for the administration 
and management of the plan. ERISA plans must hold their assets in trust by 
one or more trustees.45 Such trustees come in two flavors: discretionary 
trustees and directed trustees.46 Discretionary trustees have exclusive au-
thority to manage and administer the plan, while directed trustees are sub-
ject to the directions of discretionary trustees.47
Employee pension benefit plans come in two distinct types: defined 
benefit plans (DBPs) and defined contribution plans (DCPs).48 Because 
employers are responsible for providing a defined benefit amount to em-
ployees at retirement under DBP arrangements, there is more regulation of 
these plans so that the promised benefits are available upon retirement and 
plans do not default on their pension promises.49 For instance, ERISA pro-
vides minimum vesting, benefit accrual, and funding standards for DBPs 
and sets up an insurance scheme, operated by the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC), in case of employer defaults.50 On the other hand, 
employers are only responsible to contribute money to employees’ individ-
ual plan accounts under the DCP model and that is where their responsibil-
ity ends.51
 43.  Multiemployer plans are sponsored by more than one employer under 
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement for the benefit of union 
members, while single employer plans, the most numerous are sponsored by individual employers. See 
Secunda & Maher, supra note 27, at 185. 
 44.  See DOL MEP Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. at 37,508. 
 45.  29 U.S.C. § 1103(a). 
 46.  Id.
 47.  Id. § 1103(a)(1); U.S. DEP’T LAB., FIELD ASSISTANCE BULLETIN 2004-03 (Dec. 17, 2004), 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance/field-assistance-bulletins/2004-03 
[https://perma.cc/X8T4-HNTP]. 
 48.  See SECUNDA ET AL., supra note 28, at 187-89. 
 49.  See Secunda & Maher, supra note 27, at 738 (describing heavily regulation of DBPs). 
 50.  See id.
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Although DBPs historically were the retirement plan of choice, there 
has been a significant shift to DCPs in recent years because DCPs generally 
cost less to operate, place fewer obligations on the employer, and provide 
portability for employees who move from one employer to the next.52 The 
DOL MEP regulations solely focus on DCPs, which make sense given the 
mobile nature of alt-labor workers and the need to portable benefits.53
Defined contribution plans (sometimes referred to as individual ac-
count plans) only require the employer to a pay a defined amount into an 
employee’s individual account. At that point, it is up to the employee to 
invest the pension funds in various financial instruments so that he or she 
will have sufficient funds available to last through retirement. In other 
words, DCPs place the risk of longevity and risk of investment loss on 
employees and there is no guarantee that a participant will receive any 
specified amount of benefit at retirement.54
The 401(k) salary deferral plan is the most popular form of defined 
contribution plan, in which the employee directs the employer to divert a 
specified percentage of her salary into her retirement account rather than 
receiving it as cash compensation.55 Such contributions, like other retire-
ment plan contributions, provide the advantage of tax deferral for the em-
ployee, and tax is not paid on this income until such funds are distributed 
from the account.56
One of the chief advantages of the DCP is that it is portable from em-
ployer to employer.57 If an employee moves to another employer, which 
happens all the time in alt-labor, the employee can choose to directly roll-
over his or her individual accounts either into his or her new employer’s 
retirement plan or into an Individual Retirement Account (IRA), where the 
 52.  See COLLEEN E. MEDILL, ENRON AND THE PENSION SYSTEM, IN ENRON: CORPORATE 
FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (2004) (“[F]rom 1979 to 2001, the number of DBPs went from 
139,489 to 51,000, while the number of DCPs went from 331,432 to 707,000.”). 
 53.  See DOL MEP Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. at 37,512; see also James Earle, Expanding Retire-
ment Plan Coverage Through Association Retirement Plans, TROUTMAN SANDERS (Oct. 23, 2019), 
https://www.troutman.com/insights/expanding-retirement-plan-coverage-through-association-
retirement-plans.html#_ftn1 [https://perma.cc/T5K3-AWR2]. 
 54.  See Paul M. Secunda, 401 K Follies: A Proposal to Reinvigorate the United States Annuity 
Market, ABA SEC. TAX’N NEWS Q. 13–15 (Fall 2010) (highlighting the problems surrounding 401(k) 
plans because of lack of life income annuity options). 
 55.  See SECUNDA ET AL., supra note 28, at 189. 
 56.  See id.
 57.  See COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND 
PRACTICE 125-26 (4th ed. 2015) (“From the perspective of the employee, one key advantage of a 
defined contribution plan is the portability of the individual’s account. If a participant changes jobs, the 
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retirement monies will continue to grow tax-free.58 Employees tend to re-
ceive lump sums from their 401(k) plans upon retirement, and such funds 
may also be rolled over into an IRA.59
The Pension Protection Act of 2006 provides an additional mechanism 
for encouraging employees to save for retirement by permitting qualified 
automatic enrollment features, under which “each employee eligible to 
participate in the arrangement is treated as having elected to have the em-
ployer make elective contributions in an amount equal to a qualified per-
centage of compensation.”60 Under such arrangements, employees are 
required to be given notice of their ability to opt-out before salary deferrals 
begin.61
ERISA places fiduciary duties on those who use their discretion to 
administer and manage employee benefit plans.62 The purpose of the fidu-
ciary provisions is to ensure that persons with control over plan assets work 
in the sole interest of plan participants and beneficiaries and do not permit 
other considerations to sway their judgment concerning the operation of the 
employee benefit plan.63 ERISA fiduciaries are subject to strict fiduciary 
and co-fiduciary duties and must avoid certain prohibited transactions in-
volving plan assets.64
II. RECENTLY ENACTED DOL MEP REGULATIONS
 Having set forth the applicable ERISA legal framework for statutory 
employees, and assuming for the sake of argument that many self-
employed, small business, and precarious workers will qualify as statutory 
employees for ERISA purposes, the next question that remains is how best 
to get these workers access to employer-sponsored retirement plans. Most 
of these employees do not work for a single employer that voluntarily pro-
vides an employee benefit pension plan.65 And most of these employees do 
not belong to a union under which a collective bargaining agreement that 
provides retirement benefits in the form of a multiemployer or Taft-Hartley 
 58.  Id.
 59.  Id.
 60.  See Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA), Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 902, 120 Stat. 780 (2006). 
 61.  See id.
 62.  See Secunda, Uber Retirement, supra note 15, at 453 (describing in detail fiduciary protec-
tions under ERISA).  
 63.  Id.
 64.  See generally SECUNDA ET AL., supra note 28, at 201-06. 
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plan.66 That leaves the multiple employer pension (MEP) arrangement the 
remaining and best option for providing retirement benefits to self-
employed, small business, and precarious workers. 
The general idea under the Definition of “Employer” Under Section 
3(5) of ERISA-Association Retirement Plans and Other Multiple-Employer 
Plan Regulation (“DOL MEP Regulation”)67 is to clarify the meaning of 
“employer” under ERISA to include both (i) a “bona fide” employer group 
or association and (ii) a “bona fide” professional employer organization 
(PEO).68 More specifically, the Regulation explains that a bona fide Asso-
ciation or PEO is treated as a single plan under ERISA, even though multi-
ple contributing employers participate in it.69 The hope is that such “single 
plan” treatment under ERISA allows “simplified compliance and admin-
istration of the MEP, presumably at reduced cost and risk to the contrib-
uting employers, while also allowing a larger asset base for negotiating 
better economic terms with plan vendors and lower expense ratios for plan 
investment funds.”70
Subsection A of this Part turns to an in-depth exploration of the differ-
ent forms of MEPs permitted by the new DOL regulations. Thereafter, 
Subsection B considers the disadvantages of these new MEP forms for 
providing self-employed, small business, and precarious workers with re-
tirement benefits. Finally, Subsection C updates a recent legislative 
amendment, the Secure Act, which allows for the first time true Open 
MEPs run by PEOs without the constraints of the commonality or other 
restrictive requirements. 
A. The Different Types of MEP Models Available  
Under New DOL Regulations 
In a past article, I argued that gig companies in particular should adopt 
some form of open multiple employee pension (Open MEP) model for its 
employees using a 401(k) DCP.71 Essentially, the Open MEP model allows 
 66.  Indeed, it is because traditional unionism has not worked for them, that they are engaged in 
alternative organizing techniques. See Oswalt, supra note 1, at 96. 
 67.  See DOL MEP Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. at 37,508. 
 68.  See discussion infra Part III.A on different types of MEPs permitted by the new MEP regula-
tion. 
 69.  See Earle, supra note 53.  
 70.  See id.
 71.  See Secunda, Uber Retirement, supra note 15, at 454-58; see also 29 U.S.C.A. § 1060(a) 
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-73) (provisions on multiple employer plans and other special rules). 
Open MEPs, including their advantages and disadvantages, are discussed in comprehensive detail in 
Advisory Opinion 2012-04A. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (EBSA),
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separate, independent, companies to combine to provide retirement benefits 
to their employees. 
Under new DOL MEP regulations that went into effect on September 
30, 2019,72 three types of MEPs are now recognized by DOL: Corporate 
MEPs, Association Retirement Plans (ARPs), and Association MEPs.73
The DOL issued the final July 31, 2019 MEP regulations to “clarify[ ] that 
employer groups or associations and PEOs can, when satisfying certain 
criteria, constitute ‘employers’ within the meaning of ERISA for purposes 
of establishing or maintaining an individual account ‘employee pension 
benefit plan’ within the meaning of ERISA.”74 However, none of these 
recently-sanctioned MEPs are Open MEPs and each of these types of 
MEPs, and their shortcomings, will be discussed in turn. 
1. Corporate MEPs 
As far as corporate MEPs, historically it has taken overlapping owner-
ship of at least 80% for companies to be part of a legally cognize controlled 
group for retirement plan purposes.75 Convention wisdom has held, howev-
er, that overlapping ownership of any “meaningful” amount would suffice 
to meet the so-called commonality requirement required by MEP regula-
tions.76 So, for instance, DOL has permitted unrelated companies in differ-
ent industries in different parts of the country that have 60% common 
ownership to run corporate MEPs as long as they were part of a “bona fide 
ownership group.”77
This type of MEP seems to have limited utility in the self-employed, 
small business, and precarious worker world, as many employers who use 
such workers do not seem meet these overlapping ownership requirements. 
2. Association Retirement Plans (ARPs) 
To be considered an Association Retirement Plan or Association 
MEP, organizations have to be part of a “bona fide group or association,” 
and-advisers/guidance/advisory-opinions/2012-04a [hereinafter EBSA ADVISORY OPINION LETTER]
[https://perma.cc/VW4B-DUCX]. Until the recent regulatory interpretations, the Employee Benefit 
Security Administration (EBSA) of the DOL had found that the Open MEP arrangement was not an 
“employee pension plan” because no “employer” maintained or established the plan as required under 
Section 3(5) of ERISA. Id.
 72.  See DOL MEP Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. at 37,508. 
 73.  See id. at 37,508, 37,525-26. 
 74.  Id. at 37,508. 
 75.  DWC, supra note 18; see also DOL MEP Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. at 37,525-26. 
 76.  See DOL MEP Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. at 37,525. 
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which is defined by four criteria. First, there must be a formal organiza-
tional structure.78 There must be “indications of formality,” like by-laws or 
a governing body.79 The purpose of this prong is to make sure that both the 
organization is real and has the ability to act on behalf of participating em-
ployers.80 In this manner, this factor also protects against fraud and insol-
vency concerns.81
Second, the group or association must have a substantial business pur-
pose.82 There only has to be one substantial business purpose unrelated to 
the provision of retirement benefits.83 In this way, a commercial enterprise 
that has its primary purpose of providing benefits can be distinguished from 
a group or association that provides access to retirement benefits.84 That 
being said, the MEP regulations do make it acceptable for the provision of 
retirement benefits to be the primary purpose as long as there is at least one 
other significant purpose.85 Such a determination is made by the Depart-
ment of Labor on a case-by-case, fact-specific basis. Importantly, an asso-
ciation or group can be bona fide even if it does not sponsor the benefit 
plan itself.86
Third, the association or group providing the retirement benefits can-
not be a financial service firm.87 The MEP regulations are clear here what 
qualifies as a financial service firm: “The group or association is not a bank 
or trust company, insurance issuer, broker-dealer, or other similar financial 
services firm (including pension recordkeeper or third-party administrator), 
 78.  See id. at 37,515; see also Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin. (EBSA), Fact Sheet: Final Rule on 
Association Retirement Plans (ARPs), U.S. DEP’T LAB. (July 29, 2019), 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/fact-sheets/final-rule-on-
association-retirement-plans [https://perma.cc/8NW9-XHMP]. 
 79.  See DOL MEP Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. at 37,515. 
 80.  Id.
 81.  Id.
 82.  Id. at 37,514. 
 83.  Id. at 37,513. 
 84.  See id. 
 85.  See id. at 37,514. 
 86.  Id. (“[A] purpose other than MEP sponsorship does not have to  
be the lifeline of the organization in order to be ‘substantial.’ It must, however, be of considerable 
importance to the existence of the organization – not merely ‘important,’ but of ‘considerable’ im-
portance.”
 87.  See id. at 37,513. This is a bone of contention with those who represent financial service firms 
and would like to MEP sponsors. See AM. BENEFITS COUNCIL, supra note 22, at 2 (“The Council 
strongly encourages the DOL to expressly permit financial institutions or other persons to maintain 
defined contribution open MEPs by amending its regulations.”); The Spark Institute, Inc., RIN 1210-
AB92, “Open MEPs” and Other Issues under Section 3(5) of ERISA 1 (Oct. 29, 2019), 
https://www.sparkinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/SPARK-Comments-on-Open-MEP-RFI-
Final-10.29.19-00310873.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8NX-69XE] (“[T]he SPARK Institute continues to 
urge the Department to use its regulatory authority to permit truly open MEPs that can be spon-
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or owned or controlled by such entity or any subsidiary or affiliate of such 
an entity . . . .”88 The premise of this requirement is that without it, MEPs 
would not be “established or maintained” by employers, which would take 
it outside the scope of ERISA.89
Fourth and finally, there has to be employer member control of the or-
ganization to be a bona fide group or association.90 This requirement re-
quires employment control of form and substance, though group day-to-day 
management is not necessarily required.91 Important sub-factors to this 
requirement include: 
Whether the employer members regularly nominate and elect 
those that comprise the governing body of the association, and 
Whether they have the authority to remove any such people 
either with or without cause.92
If all four of the above requirements are met, the Association MEP is 
permitted to provide retirement plans to their members. Such plans also 
must meet three further plan requirements under DOL regulations. These 
include: (1) plan must be limited to employer members; (2) participating 
employer control; and (3) commonality.93
With regard to limitation to plan members, this plan requirement is 
fairly straightforward. Because ERISA’s focus is on employment-based 
benefits, DOL has no authority to expand benefit provision to where there 
is no employment link.94 As far as participating employer control of plan, 
this is also easily understood. It simply means that the plan itself must be 
controlled by participating employers and ”whether employer members that 
participate in the plan have the authority and opportunity to approve or veto 
decisions or activities which relate to the formation, design, amendment, 
and termination of the plan, for example, material amendments to the plan, 
including changes in coverage, benefits, and vesting.”95
The third plan requirement, commonality, proves to be the most slip-
pery. Similar to the commonality requirement with corporate MEPs, the 
 88.  DOL MEP Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. at 37517-18. 
 89.  See id at 37,518. 
 90.  See id. at 37,515. 
 91.  Id.
 92.  Id.
 93.  Id.
 94.  Id. at 37,513 (“ERISA section 3(5) and ERISA title I’s overall structure contemplate employ-
ment-based benefit arrangements. The Department’s authority to define ‘employer’ and ‘group or 
association of employers’ under ERISA section 3(5) does not broadly extend to arrangements estab-
lished to provide benefits outside the employment context and without regard to the members’ status as 
employers.”). 
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new DOL MEP regulations make some significant changes that are subject 
to some interpretation. Past regulations had required that all participating 
employers had to share some kind of organizational bond that rose to the 
level of having an interest in one another’s success.96 Indeed, there are a 
number of DOL Advisory Opinions that go through complicated scenarios 
when this commonality requirement was met and not met.97 Under the old 
rules, geographical proximity was not enough; there needed to be a “repre-
sentational nexus.”98 Now, under the new rules, similar geography and 
being part of the same industry can satisfy the commonality requirement.99
With regard to geography, commonality can now be satisfied by mere 
proximity, whether in the same state or not (though if not in the same state, 
it would have to be a metropolitan area like Philadelphia, as far as New 
Jersey and Delaware).100 In this regard, the DOL MEP Regulation notes 
that, “employers in the same geography share common interests concerning 
employee’s education and workforce development, taxation, transportation 
and commuting networks, the legal and regulatory environment . . . .”101
However, geographical commonality does not include regional commonali-
ty that extends beyond most state or metro areas.102
As far as industry, the MEP regulations now state that employers meet 
the commonality requirement by being in the same “trade, industry, line of 
business, or profession.”103 This definition is as broad as it sounds and 
there is a specific note that DOL will not “challenge the inclusion of ‘sup-
port’ or ‘allied’ businesses as members of the group or association if they 
share a genuine economic or representational interest with the other mem-
bers.”104
 96.  See Secunda, Uber Retirement, supra note 15, at 457 n.149. 
 97.  See EBSA ADVISORY OPINION LETTER, supra note 71. 
 98.  See Definition of “Employer,” 83 Fed. Reg. 28912 (June 21, 2018) [hereinafter DOL AHP 
Regulation]. 
 99.  See DOL MEP Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. at 37,515. 
 100.  See id. at 37,516. 
 101.  Id. at 37,517. 
 102.  See id. at 37,516. 
 103.  See id.
104. See id. To be clear, it is still possible that groups will challenge the scope of the DOL’s geo-
graphical requirement. In March 2019, the expansion of the commonality requirement to include geog-
raphy was rejected by being beyond the scope of the DOL’s authority by the D.C. District Court in New
York v. U.S. Department of Labor, 363 F. Supp. 3d 109 (D.D.C. 2019). In this vein, the Court stated, 
“that the geography standard under the Final Rule fails to account in any way for employers’ common-
ality of interest. This standard effectively eviscerates the genuine commonality of interest required 
under ERISA, thereby expanding the scope of the statute beyond what ERISA intended.” Id. at 134. 
That case involved a final rule by DOL instituting Associated Health Plans (AHPs) and the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA), but it would appear that the same reasoning used by the Court in that case could strike 
down the expanded definition of “bona fide associations” now utilized by the DOL in its MEP regula-
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The issue with ARP is essentially the commonality requirement, even 
with the expanded geographic and industry definition. It would still be 
difficult for employers from different parts of the country, in different in-
dustry, to allow self-employed, small business, and precarious workers to 
join in one DCP MEP. Nevertheless, the DOL defends the commonality 
requirement saying that they want to keep uniformity with the AHP rule, 
simplicity and uniformity in administration, and maintain consistency with 
other rules which work in tandem with the commonality rule.105 The DOL 
does say that it will continue to loosen the current restrictions with regard 
to the commonality requirement when it considers its RFI on Open MEP in 
a possible subsequent rule-making.106
3. PEO MEPs 
There is also multiple employer pension where the function of running 
the MEP is outsourced to a professional employer organization (PEO).107
PEOs were not invented to serve MEPs. Indeed, PEOs have existed for 
decades to provide sophisticated, professional financial services to employ-
ers who wish to provide single employer retirement plans for their employ-
ees, usually in the form of salary-deferral 401(k) plan.108 With the 
exception of the fiduciary duty to select an appropriate PEO, employers 
enjoy the advantage of outsourcing to the PEOs, thereby making the provi-
sion of retirement plans more affordable by outsourcing their potential 
fiduciary liability to the PEO.109
In 2002, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a Revenue Proce-
dure, which provided that only PEOs could offer their services through an 
MEP.110 The idea was that the beneficiaries of such plans were the employ-
ees of the serviced employer and not the PEO itself.111 On the other hand, 
DOL guidance has never been fully consistent with this IRS approach. As 
discussed above with regard to the commonality requirement with ARPs, 
unlawfully expands ERISA’s scope.”). The AHP case is now pending on appeal in front of the D.C. 
Circuit. 
 105.  See DOL MEP Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. at 37,517. 
 106.  Id. Although with the passage of the Secure Act of 2019, this RFI might now be moot since 
the new legislation permits at least one form of Open MEP.  
 107.  See id. at 37,518. 
 108.  See id. at 37,511 (According to the IRS, the term “PEO” generally refers to an organization 
that “enters into an agreement with a client to perform some or all of the federal employment tax with-
holding, reporting, and payment functions related to workers performing services for the client.”) 
(citing Certified Professional Employer Organizations, 81 Fed. Reg. 27,315 (May 6, 2016)). 
 109.  See Secunda, Uber Retirement, supra note 15, at 454. 
 110.  See Rev. Proc. 2002-21, 2002-1 C.B. 911.  
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the DOL said most of these companies did not have the necessary com-
monality to offer an MEP consistent with ERISA definitions.112
The new MEP regulations, with its expanded definition of commonali-
ty, helps to reconcile the approaches taken by the IRS and DOL. There are 
four requirements, with the various sub-requirements, that must be met.113
To be “bona fide PEOs” that “act indirectly in the interest of [its client] 
employers,” PEOs must: 
Control the MEP as the plan sponsor, the ERISA § 3(16) plan 
administrator, and as a named fiduciary. 
Limit participation in the plan to current and former employ-
ees of its employer clients. 
Make certain that each employer client participating in the 
plan has at least one employee (other than the owner) covered 
by the plan; and 
Perform substantial employment functions on behalf of its 
employer clients.114
Unpacking these requirements, some are more straightforward than 
others. 
First, with regard to PEO control of the MEP, what DOL is most con-
cerned about is that the fiduciary responsibilities of loyalty and care will be 
so dispersed among the various participating employers that essentially no 
one will be in charge of the MEP.115 To keep potential fraud from occur-
ring and the loss of plan assets, DOL squarely places all the fiduciary re-
sponsibilities on the selected PEO.116 Indeed, even after the PEO no longer 
contracts with the employer, the fiduciary duty to the participating employ-
ee continues beyond that contractual relationship between employer and 
PEO.117 Only when retirement funds are distributed to employee participat-
ing does that duty end.118
Second, and this one of the straightforward factors, participation in the 
PEO arrangement is limited to current and former employees of the em-
 112.  See infra Part III.A.2 and accompanying text. 
 113.  See DOL MEP Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. at 37,518. 
 114.  See id.
 115.  See id. at 37,519.  
 116.  See id. (“Paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of the final rule requires the PEO to have substantial control 
over the functions and activities of the MEP, as the plan sponsor (within the meaning of section 
3(16)(B) of ERISA), the plan administrator (within the meaning of section 3(16)(A) of ERISA), and a 
named fiduciary (within the meaning of section 402 of ERISA).”).  
 117.  See id.
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ployers that the PEO services.119 Under general ERISA principles, this 
means the PEO would also have obligations to the employee’s beneficiaries 
and any alternate payees (like a former spouse under a qualified domestic 
relations order (QDRO)).120
Third, PEOs are only available to employers that have at least one 
employee, so working owners need not apply.121 This is because PEOs are 
responsible to the day-to-day administration and management of benefit 
plans, and such would not be needed without an employer-employee rela-
tionship.122
Fourth, and finally, PEO MEPs must engage in substantial employ-
ment functions.123 According to the DOL, this requirement is essential be-
cause, “[r]equiring the PEO to stand in the shoes of the participating client 
employers – by assuming and performing substantial employment func-
tions that the client-employers otherwise would fulfill with respect to their 
employees – is what distinguishes bona fide PEOs under the final rule from 
service providers or other entrepreneurial ventures that in substance merely 
market or offer client-employers access to retirement plan services and 
products.”124 In other words, the PEO must undertake as a co-employer the 
crucial fiduciary obligations without which employees and their beneficiar-
ies would not have the consumer protections for their retirement benefits 
provided by ERISA.125
In order to meet a safe harbor to show the PEO engages in substantial 
employment functions, it must meet an additional four sub-factors: (1) the 
PEO must pay wages to the employees regardless of whether the PEO re-
ceives payment for these purposes from the employer; (2) the PEO must 
take care of payroll taxes, including withholding taxes for employers; (3) 
the PEO must provide benefits to, and exercise control over any benefit 
plans for, the employees for which the employer has contracted for its em-
ployees; and (4) the PEO must play a “definite and contractually specified 
role” for recruiting, hiring, and firing employees, even though the employer 
is not cut out of any of these processes and various responsibilities can be 
allocated between the PEO and employer.126
 119.  See id. at 37,518. 
 120.  See id. 
 121.  See id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  See id.  
 124.  See id. 
 125.  See id. 
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Needless to say, under these new MEP regulations, it is quite cumber-
some to be a bona fide PEO eligible to sponsor a MEP.127 Indeed, one 
wonders whether PEOs not only taking over the fiduciary responsibility of 
providing retirement, but also having to engage in temporary agency func-
tions like hiring and firing, might dissuade many of the otherwise interested 
parties from going this route.128
Keep in mind also that the selection of the PEO by the employer con-
tinues to be a fiduciary decision by the employer, which cannot be under-
taken lightly.129 Employers not living up to these exacting standards could 
be sued by the U.S. Department of Labor, other plan fiduciaries, or partici-
pants or beneficiaries of the plan, just like any other breaching fiduciary 
under ERISA.130 Yet, this aspect of the PEO MEP is perhaps the most cru-
cial advantage of providing companies that utilize self-employed, small 
business, and precarious workers the ability to provide retirement benefits 
through the financial intermediation of a MEP trustee to lessen the financial 
and regulatory burden of providing such benefits.131
B. Disadvantages of Current MEP Regulations 
It goes without saying that the current types of MEPs available to em-
ployers as of September 30, 2019, are far from ideal.132 The corporate MEP 
does not apply to most employers in this sector of economy as far as con-
trolled groups and overlapping ownership.133 It is not clear that the new 
expanded definition of commonality for Associated Retirement Plans 
(ARPs) is consistent with existing ERISA requirements, and if the recent 
invalidation of AHPs is upheld by the appeals court, ARPs might be short-
 127.  Accord AM. BENEFITS COUNCIL, supra note 22, at 2; Spark Institute, Inc., supra note 87, at 1-
2 (As further explained below, the SPARK Institute believes that the Department should further elimi-
nate barriers to MEP participation by permitting financial services firms to sponsor MEPs, removing the 
“limiting principles” that currently restrict greater MEP participation, and working with other regulators 
to reduce any MEP barriers that are beyond the Department’s jurisdiction.” ). 
 128.  See Spark Institute, Inc., supra note 87, at 10. 
 129.  See DOL MEP Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. at 37,522 (“Although participating employers 
would retain fiduciary responsibility for choosing and monitoring the arrangement and forwarding 
required contributions to the MEP, a participating employer could keep more of its day-to-day focus on 
managing its business, rather than on its plan.”). 
 130.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)-(3) (2018) (setting up breach of fiduciary duty enforcement 
actions). 
 131.  See DOL MEP Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. at 37,522. 
 132.  Accord AM. BENEFITS COUNCIL, supra note 22, at 2; Spark Institute, Inc., supra note 87, at 1-
2. 
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lived as well.134 Finally, the PEO MEPs, which at the outset seems perhaps 
to have the most promise, suffer from additional requirements with regard 
to substantial employment functions which might dissuade traditional PE-
Os to want to assume this role and its attendant liabilities.135
In short, none of the regulatory options are truly Open MEPs which 
permit companies to provide an effective vehicle for workers to be able to 
pool their retirement savings and receive inexpensive plans run by sophisti-
cated investment professionals.136 Rather, the answer appears now to lie in 
recently-enacted legislation which alters the terms of ERISA. 
C. The Secure Act of 2019 
Although current regulatory reforms are neither sufficient nor ade-
quate to provide portable retirement benefits, there are a number of ad-
vantages that a true Open MEP model would supply for self-employed, 
small business, and precarious employees. From an employee perspective, 
perhaps one of the biggest problems is that these employees lack access to 
retirement benefits.137 If one’s employer does not offer employee benefits 
(which they are legally able to do because employee benefit sponsorship in 
the United States is voluntary as discussed above),138 then employees may 
be able to take advantage of one of the new state-based automatic IRA 
programs139 or seek to save themselves through private IRAs.140 Either 
way, such employees have historically been shown either to save very little 
or nothing at all for retirement.141
The solution for self-employed, small business, and precarious work-
ers is to be deemed “employees” and then have their employers establish 
 134.  See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 135.  See supra note 132. 
 136.  See AM. BENEFITS COUNCIL, supra note 22, at 10 (“That being said, we do not believe that 
the concerns that have been raised over the potential cost and complexity of nationwide open MEPs are 
warranted or outsized in comparison to analogous plans.”). 
 137.  See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
 138.  See Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 517 (2010) (quoting Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 
542 U.S. 200, 215 (2004)) (ERISA only encourages the voluntary creation of plans, but does not man-
date them).
 139.  See Andrew Remo, DOL’s Proposed Safe Harbor for State Savings Programs: A Closer 
Look, NAPA.NET (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.napa-net.org/news/technical-competence/state-auto-ira-
plans/dols-proposed-safe-harbor-for-state-savings-programs-a-closer-look/ [https://perma.cc/LB2S-
RDEK]; see also Secunda, Uber Retirement, supra note 15, at 443-44 (discussing the advantages and 
disadvantages of such programs for specifically gig workers).  
 140.  Statistics suggest that very few workers not covered by workplace retirement plans save on 
their own through IRAs or other methods. See DOL MEP Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. at 37508 (“Among 
workers who do not have access to a workplace retirement plan, only about 13 percent regularly con-
tribute to individual retirement accounts, commonly called IRAs.”). 
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DCP Open MEPs. This model allows both employers and employees to 
pool their retirement contributions, and get the best investment options at 
the lowest prices.142 The advantages for employers is the tax deduction that 
comes with such retirement contributions,143 the competitive advantage in 
obtaining better workers by offering a better benefit package, and the abil-
ity to off-load most of their fiduciary liability in co-sponsoring such a plan 
to PEOs.144
The advantage to employees is the ability to not even have to think 
about retirement savings and automatically let it happen. By setting up an 
open MEP with automatic enrollment and automatic escalation features 
with a wide variety of employers participating, these employees would be 
able to take advantage of tax-exempt retirement savings through basic be-
havioral economic devices.145 These employees would also be enrolled and 
have a portion of their salary contributed to their individual MEP account 
without becoming bogged down in complex retirement decisions and pro-
crastinating over various and complex investment options.146 Because of 
their significant purchasing power and economies of scale, these Open 
MEPs would have access to the lowest-price wholesale mutual funds and 
other investments so that workers would default into a highly-diversified, 
low-fee retirement account.147 If some workers wanted more control or had 
more financial savvy, they could easily opt-out and place their retirement 
money in whatever proportions in whatever funds the Open MEP offers as 
investment options.148
As I reported in a previous article in 2016,149 Open MEP legislative 
proposals showed promise. Former Senator Orrin Hatch initially introduced 
the Retirement Enhancement and Savings Act of 2016 (RESA),150 which 
 142.  See GALE, supra note 11, at 12 (“MEPs have lower administrative costs and a simpler regula-
tory structure than a 401(k), and could be offered to independent workers as well as traditional employ-
ees if Congress and regulators approve.”).  
 143.  See id. at 15 (“Research that focuses on low-income households, however, generally finds 
larger impacts of [tax] saving incentives on net saving.”). 
 144.  See DOL MEP Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. at 37522. 
 145.  See Paul M. Secunda, The Behavioral Economic Case for Paternalistic Workplace Pensions, 
91 IND. L. REV. 505, 529-30 (2016) [hereinafter Secunda, The Behavioral Economic Case). 
 146.  See id. at 524-25 (discussing procrastination and inertia associated with many individuals 
when it comes to complex financial decisions involving retirement saving). 
 147.  See Drobylen, supra note 24 (“Such plans offer diversified and cost-efficient market returns 
for participants and low liability and time commitment for business owners.”). 
 148.  See Secunda, The Behavioral Economic Case, supra note 145, at 527. 
 149.  See Secunda, Uber Retirement, supra note 15, at 439. 
 150.  See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., 2D SESS., DESCRIPTION 
OF THE CHAIRMAN’S MODIFICATION OF THE “RETIREMENT ENHANCEMENT AND SAVINGS ACT OF 






      06/12/2020   13:18:38
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 123 Side B      06/12/2020   13:18:38
9 SECUNDA MACRO 1 EIC 5.4 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2020 10:53 PM 
238 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 95:1 
would have permitted Open MEPs for private sector employees and allow 
multiple employers to pool retirement funds into a single 401(k) retirement 
plan starting in 2020.151 In addition to doing away with the commonality 
requirement discussed with regard to the new DOL MEP regulations, an-
other difficulty, the so-called “one-bad-apple rule,” would be eliminated 
and no longer would entire MEPs be disqualified from favorable tax treat-
ment if one employer did not meet the applicable tax rules.152
In 2019, the same basic RESA bill passed the House of Representa-
tives with broad bipartisan support. Indeed, since the beginning of the 
116th Congress in 2018, no less than seven bills dealing with Open MEPs 
have been introduced, including H.R. 1994, the “Setting Every Community 
Up for Retirement and Enhancement Act of 2019,” commonly known as 
the “SECURE Act.”153 The House overwhelmingly passed the SECURE 
Act on May 23, 2019 by a vote of 417-3.154
Simultaneously, legislation has been introduced on the Senate side. 
Indeed, the SECURE Act contains the MEP provisions found in RESA, re-
introduced by Senate Finance Committee Chair Charles Grassley (R-IA) 
and Ranking Member Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) on April 1, 2019.155 RESA 
has language to the effect that, “two or more unrelated private employers 
[would be allowed] to adopt a defined contribution pooled employer plan 
(PEP) as long as the PEP has a pooled plan provider (PPP) as the named 
fiduciary to the plan.”156 Pensions & Investments explains succinctly what 
happened from there leading to its enactment: 
The Setting Every Community up for Retirement Enhancement Act of 
2019, referred to as the SECURE Act, was attached Dec. 16, [2019] to a 
fiscal year 2020 appropriations bill that had a Dec. 20 deadline. With a 
deal worked out the previous weekend, lawmakers moved quickly to 
pass a $1.4 trillion spending package — the House approved it Dec. 17, 
the Senate Dec. 19, and the president, at press time, was expected to sign 
it into law.157
 151.  See Secunda, Uber Retirement, supra note 15, at 456. 
 152.  See Special Rules for Plans Maintained By More Than One Employer, 26 C.F.R. § 1.413-
2(a)(3)(iv) (2019); Questions and Answers on Top-Heavy Plans, 26 C.F.R. § 1.416-1 (G-2) (2019). 
 153.  Pub. L. No. 116-94, 133 Stat. 2534 (2019). 
 154.  See DOL MEP Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. at 37509.  
 155.  Id. at 37509 n.10.  
 156.  See Andrew Remo, MEPs Resurface as ‘PEPs’ as Senate Finance Approves New Retirement 
Bill, NAPA.NET (Sep. 22, 2016), http://www.napa-net.org/news/technical-
competence/legislation/meps-resurface-as-peps-as-senate-finance-approves-new-retirement-bill/ 
[https://perma.cc/5SD9-LW85] [hereinafter Remo, MEPs Resurface]. 
 157.  The bill was in fact signed into law on December 20, and as far as the Open MEP provisions, 
went into effect for plan years starting in January 2021. See Brian Croce, Secure Act moves to reality 
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Under new IRC §413(e), Open MEPs will not fail to be qualified for 
favored tax treatment due to the errors of an employer (the old bad apple 
rule) if the DC plan is “[m]aintained by employers that have a common 
interest other than maintaining the plan” or has a pooled plan provider 
(“PPP”).”158 The IRS is expected to issue a model open MEP plan (now to 
be called “Pooled Employer Plans” or “PEPs”) and guidance for PPPs in 
2020.159
Back in 2015, Senator Elizabeth Warren perceptively recognized dur-
ing hearings on Hatch’s bill, this new Open MEP approach is well-suited 
for self-employed, small business, precarious employees because of the 
mobile and sometime part-time nature of their work.160 The Secure Act 
allows companies to pool their contributions into a common 401(k) retire-
ment plan, with all the advantages that come with belonging to a large 
fund.161 Most importantly, such funds have the advantages of providing 
participating employees diversification, low costs, reporting and disclosure 
requirements, and fiduciary protections based on the trust-based status of 
such 401(k) plans.162 It is the ability to pool resources to purchase low-cost 
pension benefits which is now a reality for workers in the United States as 
of late 2019. 






FFCA2D7561A4BA3FA20289 [https://perma.cc/S7XF-GKHJ]. The bill also has other important 
retirement provisions. See id. (“The SECURE Act features wide-ranging provisions, including ones that 
make it easier for smaller employers to join multiple employer plans, ease non-discrimination rules for 
frozen defined benefit plans, increase the automatic-enrollment safe harbor cap to 15% from 10%, and 
allow long-term part-time workers to participate in 401(k) plans.”).  
 158.  IRC § 413(e). 
 159.  See Marta Ward, Flashpoint: New Pension Legislation Passes! Feeling More Secure?, 
FERENCZY BENEFITS L. CTR. (Dec. 24, 2019), https://ferenczylaw.com/flashpoint-new-pension-
legislation-passes-feeling-more-secure/ [https://perma.cc/VQ6X-28HX]. 
 160.  See Secunda, Uber Retirement, supra note 15, at 458. 
 161.  See Spark Institute, Inc., supra note 87, at 5 (“Not only would such an action create a new 
channel for small employers that do not engage with an employer association or PEO, it would also 
create greater competition and choice for all small employers; and as a market force, that competition 
and choice would increase efficiencies and lower costs for participating employers and employees.”). 
 162.  See Drobylen, supra note 24. See also Croce, supra note 157 (“[T]he open MEP provision 
will provide more opportunities to small employers who do not have the bandwidth and benefits 
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The purpose of this last Part, now that the Secure Act is a reality, is to 
argue for employers who currently do not provide retirement benefits to 
their workers to provide a portable retirement plan that would have the best 
chance to provide accessible and adequate retirement plans to self-
employed, small business, and precarious workers. Given that such workers 
normally work for many employers at one time and/or over the course of 
their careers in various locations and industries, the argument is that these 
Open MEP workers will one portable individual retirement accounts 
throughout their careers that can be part of a larger Open MEP DCP 401(k) 
plan.163
Under such a system, none of the employers would have to be related, 
nor does there have to be any longer a substantial employment requirement 
like there is for bona fide PEOs under the DOL regulations.164 Indeed, un-
der the PEO model now possible under the Secure Act, the hope is that 
employees will be able to use their same individual account plan under the 
sponsorship of a PEO which already has their basic employment infor-
mation, while at the same time providing a competitive menu of investment 
selections for these workers’ retirement portfolios. 
The challenge now is to give employers incentive to adopt these Open 
MEPs sponsored by PEOs and to make sure employees do not opt out of 
these plans. Although tax incentives will certainly provide some incentive 
to employers, clearly such incentives has proven thus far insufficient given 
the number of private employees not covered by workplace retirement 
plans. This is where the alt-labor movement can play a very important role 
by organizing to pressure employers to adopt such Open MEP PEO plans 
for their small business and precarious employees. Such alt-labor strategies 
would also educate less sophisticate workers of the advantage of joining 
such retirement plans and pressure them not to opt-out once auto-enrolled. 
Finally, although this development would not represent that complete 
disconnection of retirement benefits from employers that I generally es-
pouse, it will be a welcome step in that direction. Currently, employers are 
doing everything in their power to unload their old defined benefit plans165
or to outsource their fiduciary responsibility when it comes to DCP 
plans.166 Employees need a fool-proof way to invest in passive indexed 
retirement products and annuities, in an appropriate mix, so that they will 
have sufficient income to retire upon and then not outlive their retirement 
 163.  Accord AM. BENEFITS COUNCIL, supra note 22, at 9-10. 
 164.  See supra Parts III.A.2 & III.A.3. 
 165.  See Secunda & Maher, supra note 27, at 735-36. 





      06/12/2020   13:18:38
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 125 Side A      06/12/2020   13:18:38
9 SECUNDA MACRO 1 EIC 5.4 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2020 10:53 PM 
2020] EMERGING LAW OF PORTABLE RETIREMENT BENEFITS 241 
savings no matter how long they live.167 There is no magic formula in this 
regard, except that the ability to participate in an occupational retirement 
program from the beginning of one’s career is certainly key. Also key is to 
have behavioral finance mechanisms in place that automatically enroll 
unsophisticated workers and auto-escalation provisions that allow them to 
invest more money in retirement as the workers progress in their careers 
and make more money.168
In the future, it might not matter whether one is classified as an “em-
ployee” or “independent contractor,” as all workers will have access to 
portable occupational retirement benefits, unconnected from whomever 
they work. Although this concept may seem foreign to workers in the Unit-
ed States, such systems already exist in many countries throughout the 
industrial world.169 As the world increasingly produces non-traditional 
employees and precarious working conditions, it will be increasingly im-
portant to have an Open MEP model available to pool retirement funds in 
plans run by investment professionals. 
There are also a number of additional advantages to this PEO Open 
MEP model. First, it outsources the myriad of fiduciaries’ duties to the 
PEO.170 These onerous fiduciary requirements include: qualifying the plan 
for tax-favored status under the Internal Revenue Code’s non-
discrimination rules, operating and managing the plan on a day-to-day ba-
sis, and engaging in investment selection (perhaps through retention of a 
third-party investment advisor).171 The only fiduciary duty that employer 
members of an Open MEP would retain would be to prudently select, and 
then monitor, the PEO, thus limiting their exposure to potential fiduciary 
liability.172 Additionally, the price tag of permitting the formation of these 
organizations is relatively low according to at least one source: $3.2 billion 
over 10 years from the loss of tax revenue from the additional tax deduc-
tion for employers and tax-exempt status for employee contributions.173
This is not to say everyone is a fan. Some have argued that Open 
MEPs “make it easier for 401(k) providers to obfuscate fees and conflicts 
 167.  Drobylen, supra note 24.  
 168.  See generally Secunda, The Behavioral Economic Case, supra note 145.  
 169.  Australia is an example of a mandatory defined contribution system run by professional 
“superannuation” funds, mostly disconnected from the employer. See id. at 534-40.  
 170.  See DOL MEP Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. at 37522. 
 171.  See Remo, MEPs Resurface, supra note 156.  
 172.  See DOL MEP Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. at 37522; cf. Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 
1823, 1828-29 (2015) (holding that plan sponsors of 401(k) plan still have a fiduciary duty in selecting 
and monitoring participant investment options). 
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of interest.”174 Indeed, one commentator maintains that he thinks “the push 
for MEPs signals a broken 401(k) industry that prioritizes profit ahead of 
the interests of retirement savers.”175 Be that as it may, when it comes to 
the plight of self-employed, small business, and precarious workers and 
their general inability to have access to workplace retirement plans, the 
DCP Open MEP model provides the best prospect for these workers to 
have a chance to have the same benefits as their more traditional unionized 
and non-unionized employee counterparts. 
CONCLUSION
The rise of alt-labor with its itinerant, precarious workers, in conjunc-
tion with the large number of self-employed and small business workers, 
means there is a wide swath of American workers that do not have access 
to workplace retirement plans. Although the current DOL MEP regulations 
do not provide the necessary flexibility to permit many of these workers the 
wherewithal to gain these benefits through Association or PEO MEPs, the 
new Secure Act legislation certainly provides tremendous promise. 
As long as such workers can fulfill the definition of “employee” for 
ERISA purposes, the Secure Act amendments to ERISA permit the devel-
opment of Open MEPs, or retirement plans for employees who work for 
unrelated employers. Done properly, and using PEOs to outsource most of 
the fiduciary liability and provide cheaper funds that come with large pools 
of assets and diverse investment opportunities, more workers now finally 
have a fighting chance to be part of a system where they are able to stash 
away money on a low-fee, easily accessible basis so that they more likely 
can have a retirement and live comfortably during their golden years. 
By no means is this the end of the portable retirement benefit story. 
Future proposals, for instance, will need to consider how such workers 
should spend-down such retirement assets through various forms of partial 
annuitization. For now, however, it suffices for purposes of this article to 
provide a viable mechanism for self-employed, small business, and precar-
ious workers to accumulate retirement wealth. Now that the Secure Act 
allows for Open MEPs run by PEOs, the need exists to provide the incen-
tive for employers to provide these retirement saving vehicles to their em-
ployers and education to these currently uncovered employees as to why 
joining such retirement plans is essential to their future retirement security. 
The alt-labor movement is perfectly situated to pressure employers to adopt 
 174.  Drobylen, supra note 24. 
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such plans to educate workers regarding the need to invest early and often 
in their retirement security.
